Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation

Research Projects and Empirical Data

1-1-2011

Thomas More Law Center v. Obama - Amicus Brief
of Oregon et al.
State of Oregon

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
Automated Citation
State of Oregon, "Thomas More Law Center v. Obama - Amicus Brief of Oregon et al." (2011). Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act Litigation. Paper 260.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/260

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850706 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 1

No. 10–2388
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
___________________
THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BARACK OBAMA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan
No. 10–11156 (Steeh, J.)
___________________
BRIEF OF THE STATES OF OREGON, IOWA, NEW YORK,
CALIFORNIA, VERMONT, HAWAII, MARYLAND, DELAWARE
AND CONNECTICUT
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
___________________
JOHN R. KROGER
Attorney General of Oregon
MARY H. WILLIAMS
Solicitor General
KEITH S. DUBANEVICH
Chief of Staff and Special Counsel
1162 Court Street NE
Salem, OR 97301-4096
Telephone: (503) 378-6002

TOM MILLER
Attorney General of Iowa
MARK SCHANTZ
Solicitor General
1305 E. Walnut Street
Des Moines, IA 50319
Telephone: (802) 828-3181
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
State of Iowa

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
State of Oregon
Dated: January 21, 2011
(additional counsel listed on inside cover)

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850706 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 2

Additional Counsel:
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of New York
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224-0341
Telephone: (518) 474-7201
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
State of New York
WILLIAM H. SORRELL
Attorney General of Vermont
109 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05609-1001
Telephone: (802) 828-3171
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
State of Vermont

KAMALA D. HARRIS
Attorney General of California
J. MATTHEW RODRIQUEZ
Chief Deputy Attorney General
1300 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (916) 445-9555
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
State of California

DAVID M. LOUIE
Attorney General of Hawaii
GIRARD D. LAU
Acting Solicitor General
425 Queen Street
Honolulu, HA 96813
Telephone: (808) 586-1500
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
State of Hawaii

GEORGE C. JEPSEN
Attorney General of Connecticut
55 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06106
Telephone: (860) 808-5270
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
State of Connecticut

JOSEPH R. BIDEN III
Attorney General of Delaware
LAWRENCE W. LEWIS
State Solicitor of Delaware
820 N. French Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Telephone: (302) 577-8400
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
State of Delaware

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER
Attorney General of Maryland
200 Saint Paul Place
Baltimore, MD 21202
Telephone: (410) 576-6300
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
State of Maryland

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850706 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTERESTS OF THE AMICI STATES ...................................................1

II.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................4

III.

THE ACA’S MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS
CONSTITUTIONAL. ................................................................................6
A.

The minimum coverage provision is necessary for the
success of health care reform and the overall stability of the
nation’s health insurance markets. ...................................................6

B.

The minimum coverage provision fits within Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause. ...........................................................................9
1.

Congress has broad authority to regulate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce............................... 9

2.

The minimum coverage provision is constitutional
because it regulates activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce and because it is an essential part
of comprehensive regulation of interstate economic
activity................................................................................. 13
a.

The minimum coverage provision regulates
activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce.................................................................. 13

b.

The minimum coverage provision is an
essential part of comprehensive regulation of
interstate economic activity...................................... 17

CONCLUSION...................................................................................................19
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Cited
Gonzalez v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) ...................................................... 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19
i

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850706 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 4

Thomas More Law Center v. Obama,
720 F.Supp 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ............................................................4
United States v. Comstock,
130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010) ........................................................... 12, 13, 18, 19
United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) .......................................................................... 10, 11
United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) .................................................................................11
Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942) .............................................................. 10, 11, 12, 14
Constitutional & Statutory Provisions
U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 ..................................................................................... 9, 12
Other Authorities
2011-2012 Governor’s Budget Summary (Jan. 10, 2011) ...................................3
A.C.A. § 1501(a)(1)............................................................................................13
A.C.A. § 1501(A)(2)...................................................................................... 4, 13
A.C.A. § 1501(a)(2)(B).......................................................................................17
A.C.A. § 1501(a)(2)(F) .......................................................................................17
A.C.A. § 1501(a)(2)(G) ........................................................................................4
A.C.A. § 1501(e)...................................................................................................5
California Association of Health Plans, 10 Factors Driving Costs for
California’s Hospitals (Nov. 2010)..........................................................16
Bowen Garrett et. al., The Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform: Implications
for States (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Urban Institute
Sept. 2009)..............................................................................................2, 3
Cal. Ins. Code, § 12710.........................................................................................8
California HealthCare Foundation, California’s Uninsured (Dec. 2010)............9
Dianne Miller Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller, The Consequences of
Uninsurance for Individuals, Families, Communities, and the Nation, 32
J.L. Med. & Ethics 397 (2004) .................................................................15
ii

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850706 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 5

Fed. R. App. P. 29(a) ............................................................................................1
Hearings to Examine Health Care Access and Affordability and Its Impact on
the Economy: Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on
Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2003) ........................................................16
Jordan Ru, Few Can Use State High-Risk Pool for Uninsured, Los Angeles
Times, Oct. 28, 2008 ..................................................................................8
Kaiser Family Foundation, Hospital Emergency Room Visits per 1,000
Population, 1999 ......................................................................................17
Kaiser Family Foundation, Total Health Care Employment, 2009....................17
Linda J Blumberg and John Holahan, The Individual Mandate – An Affordable
and Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 NEJM 6
(2009)..........................................................................................................8
Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance Reform, Part II:
Congressional Power (Nov. 2, 2009).........................................................9
Peter Harbage and Len M. Nichols, Ph.D., A Premium Price: The Hidden Costs
All Californians Pay in Our Fragmented Health Care System” (New
America Foundation, Dec. 2006) .............................................................15
Shana A. Lavarreda et al., Number of Uninsured Jumped to More than Eight
Million from 2007 to 2009 (University of California, Los Angeles Mar.
2010) ...........................................................................................................2
Stan Dorn, Uninsured and Dying Because of It: Updating the Institute of
Medicine Analysis on the Impact of Uninsurance on Mortality (Urban
Institute Jan. 2008) .....................................................................................1
Susan A. Channick, Can State Health Reform Initiatives Achieve Universal
Coverage? California’s Recent Failed Experiment, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc.
L.J. 485 (2009) .........................................................................................15
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Early Release of Selected
Estimates Based on Data From the 2008 National Health Interview
Survey Table 1.1a (2009) ...........................................................................4
USC Center for Health Financing, Policy, and Management, Marginal Costs of
Emergency Department Outpatient Visits: An update using California
data (Nov. 2005) ......................................................................................16

iii

Case: 10-2388 Document: 006110850706 Filed: 01/21/2011 Page: 6

BRIEF OF THE STATES OF OREGON, IOWA, NEW YORK,
CALIFORNIA, VERMONT, HAWAII, MARYLAND, DELAWARE
AND CONNECTICUT
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
_______________
I.

INTERESTS OF THE AMICI STATES

Amici, all of whom are sovereign states of the United States, file this
brief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a).1 As sovereign
states, amici are charged with protecting and promoting the health and welfare
of their citizens. Citizen access to affordable medical care is necessary for the
states to promote health, prevent disease, and heal the sick. In our modern
system of advanced yet costly medical care, comprehensive health insurance
coverage is critical to achieving that end. It is well documented that a lack of
health insurance coverage leads to increased morbidity, mortality, and
individual financial burdens.2
In connection with their duties to protect and promote the health and
welfare of their citizens, amici have engaged in varied, creative, and determined

1

Rule 29(a) provides that “[t]he United States or its officer or
agency or a state may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the
parties or leave of court.” Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).
2

See, e.g., Stan Dorn, Uninsured and Dying Because of It: Updating
the Institute of Medicine Analysis on the Impact of Uninsurance on Mortality
(Urban Institute Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411588_uninsured_dying.pdf (last visited
Jan. 11, 2011).
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state-by-state efforts to expand and improve health insurance coverage in their
states and to contain health care costs. Despite some successes, these state-bystate efforts have fallen short. As a consequence, amici have concluded that a
national solution is necessary.
Oregon’s predicament illustrates the problem that states now face.
Despite a variety of legislative efforts to increase access to insurance coverage,
21.8% of Oregonians lack health insurance. Absent health care reform, Oregon
expects that figure to rise to approximately 27.4% in the next 10 years. 3 In
2009, Oregon spent approximately $2.6 billion on Medicaid and CHIP. Absent
health care reform, that figure is expected to grow to approximately $5.5 billion
by 2019.4
Other states face similarly dire circumstances. For example, in 2009,
over 8 million Californians—nearly one in four people under the age of 65—
lacked insurance for all or part of the year.5 This represents a 28 percent

3

Bowen Garrett et al., The Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform:
Implications for States, 51 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Urban
Institute Oct. 1, 2009), available at:
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411965_failure_to_enact.pdf (last visited
Jan. 11, 2011).
4

Id.

5

Shana A. Lavarreda et al., Number of Uninsured Jumped to More
than Eight Million from 2007 to 2009 (University of California, Los Angeles
Mar. 2010), available at
Footnote continued…
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increase in the number of uninsured Californians from 2007. Moreover, over
5.5 million Californians were enrolled in Medi-Cal or California’s Healthy
Families Program during 2009.6 Providing health care benefits to these
Californians who would have been otherwise uninsured comes at a considerable
cost to the state. The proposed budget for the 2011–2012 Fiscal Year includes
$83.5 billion in spending on Health and Human Services, close to 50 percent of
which will go to Medi-Cal alone.7 Of those funds, $ 27.1 billion comes from
the General Fund, which is facing a $25 billion deficit. 8
The situation that states now face is unsustainable. And without national
reform, state-level health care costs will rise dramatically over the next 10
years. Even as states are forced to spend more and more to keep up with
skyrocketing health care costs, the number of individuals without insurance will
continue to rise if the subject health care reform is not implemented.9

(…continued)

http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/Uninsured_8Million_PB_%200310.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).
6

Id.

7

2011–2012 Governor’s Budget Summary at 95–96 (Jan. 10, 2011),

available at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (last
accessed Jan. 13, 2011).
8

Id. at 4.

9

Bowen Garrett et al., supra note 3, at 51.
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a national
solution that will help amici fulfill their duty to protect and promote the health
and welfare of their citizens. The law strikes an appropriate balance between
national requirements that promote the goal of expanding access to health care
in a cost-effective manner and state flexibility in designing programs to achieve
that goal. As the district court correctly concluded, the ACA achieves these
goals without running afoul of any constitutional limits on federal government
authority. The amici urge this court to affirm the district court’s decision.
II.

INTRODUCTION

As the district court recognized, the nation’s health care system is in a
state of crisis. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp 882, 893 (E.D.
Mich. 2010). As of 2008, 43.8 million people in the United States had no
health insurance coverage and thus no or little access to health care.10 Indeed,
Congress found that “62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part
by medical expenses.” ACA § 1501(a)(2)(G).11 And state-level health care
costs will only continue to rise. These increases threaten to overwhelm already

10

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Early Release of
Selected Estimates Based on Data From the 2008 National Health Interview
Survey Table 1.1a (2009), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200906_01.pdf (last visited
Jan. 11, 2011).
11

All references to ACA § 1501(A)(2) are to §1501 as amended by §
10106 of the ACA.
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overburdened state budgets. Without a national solution to the health care crisis,
the amici states would be forced for the foreseeable future to spend more and
more on health care and yet still slide further and further away from their goal
of protecting the health and well-being of their citizens.
The ACA will allow states to expand and improve health insurance
coverage. The ACA achieves coverage increases through a variety of
mechanisms, including the implementation of a minimum coverage provision
that requires most residents of the United States, starting in 2014, to obtain
health insurance or pay a tax. But among other exceptions, the minimum
coverage provision does not apply to those whose income falls below a
specified level or to those who can demonstrate that purchasing insurance
would pose a hardship.12 In other words, the minimum coverage provision is
targeted at those who, while they can afford it, choose not to purchase insurance
and choose instead to “self insure,” relying on luck, their own financial
reserves, and the health care social safety net of emergency rooms and public
insurance programs to catch them when they fall ill.

12

Individuals who will not be subject to the individual mandate
include those with incomes low enough that they are not required to file an
income tax return (in 2009 the threshold for taxpayers under age 65 was $9,350
for singles and $18,700 for couples), those who would have to pay more than a
certain percentage of their income (8% in 2014) to obtain health insurance, and
those who can demonstrate that purchasing insurance would pose a hardship.
ACA § 1501(e).
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Appellants, who have chosen “not to purchase health insurance or obtain
the government-mandated level of coverage required by the Act,” agree that the
health care insurance market is in “need of repair.” Appellants’ Br. 14, 30.
They further agree that the health care insurance market generally falls within
the Commerce Clause. Appellants’ Br. 30. They nevertheless maintain that the
individual coverage provision exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
As Appellants frame their argument, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress
to regulate only activity and not, as they characterize it, the “inactivity” of
refusing to purchase health insurance. But appellants ignore the effect on
interstate commerce of refusing to comply with the minimum coverage
provision and thus mischaracterize the conduct for which they seek this Court’s
imprimatur as “inactivity.” Moreover, they lose sight of the principal concern
that animates the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, namely,
ensuring a meaningful distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local. For the reasons explained below, the minimum coverage provision
fits easily within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
III.
A.

THE ACA’S MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS
CONSTITUTIONAL.

The minimum coverage provision is necessary for the success of
health care reform and the overall stability of the nation’s health
insurance markets.
Any fair review of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause to

enact the minimum coverage provision must be conducted in the context of
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examining why the minimum coverage provision is crucial to national health
care reform. One of the primary goals of the ACA is to increase the number of
Americans who have access to health insurance coverage. Insurance is a
system of shared risk. But in a system where purchasing insurance is purely
voluntary, people with higher than average health risks will disproportionately
enroll in insurance plans, as an individual is more likely to purchase insurance
when he or she expects to require health care services. This phenomenon is
commonly referred to as “adverse selection.”
Adverse selection raises the cost of insurance premiums for two reasons:
first, because adverse selection tends to create insurance pools with higher than
average risks and premiums reflect the average cost of providing care for the
members of the pool, the overall cost is higher. Second, because insurers fear
the potentially substantial costs associated with individuals with non-obvious
high health risks disproportionately enrolling in their insurance plans, insurers
will often add an extra loading fee to their premiums, particularly in the small
group and individual markets. An individual mandate addresses both of these
problems, first by driving low-risk people into the risk pool, thus driving down
average costs, and second by lessening the probability that a given individual is
purchasing insurance solely because he or she knows something the insurer
does not know about his or her health status, thereby reducing insurer hedging
and the fees associated with adverse selection.
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Another consequence of adverse selection is that insurers enact a variety
of policies designed to keep high-cost individuals out of their plans and limit
the financial cost to the plan if those individuals enroll—such as limiting
coverage for preexisting conditions, denying coverage, charging higher
premiums for those with actual or anticipated health problems, and imposing
benefit caps. While some states have attempted to grapple with this problem by
establishing programs such as California’s Major Risk Medical Insurance
Program, which covers otherwise “uninsurable” individuals, these programs are
often prohibitively expensive.13 The ACA seeks to eliminate many of these
adverse-selection avoidant practices by outlawing preexisting condition
exclusions and requiring insurers to issue policies to anyone who applies.
These reforms are, of course, designed to increase access to insurance.
However, the reality is that “[i]nsurance pools cannot be stable over time, nor
can insurers remain financially viable, if people enroll only when their costs are
expected to be high. . .[a]nd research leaves no doubt that without an individual
mandate, many people will remain uninsured” until they get sick.14 Young
Americans are especially inclined to forgo purchasing health insurance in favor

13

See Cal. Ins. Code, § 12710 et seq.; Jordan Ru, Few Can Use State
High-Risk Pool for Uninsured, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 28, 2008.
14

Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, The Individual Mandate—An
Affordable and Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 New Eng.
J. Med. 6, 6–7 (2009).
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of other consumption. In California, for instance, 18 to 34 year-olds represent
43 percent of the state’s uninsured.15 If pre-existing conditions are eliminated
with no requirement that one purchase insurance, these people would have an
incentive to forgo coverage until they get sick—and the high-risk pool would
collapse from inadequate funding.16 A minimum coverage requirement that
requires everyone to pay into the risk pool will dramatically reduce adverse
selection, and make it practical to insist upon coverage for individuals with preexisting conditions.
B.

The minimum coverage provision fits within Congress’s authority
under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
1.

Congress has broad authority to regulate activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.

The United States Constitution empowers Congress to “make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States.” U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause power
includes the authority to “regulate those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect

15

California HealthCare Foundation, California’s Uninsured at 18
(Dec. 2010), available at http://www.chcf.org/publications/2010/12/californiasuninsured (last visited Jan. 13, 201).
16

See Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance
Reform, Part II: Congressional Power (Nov. 2, 2009), available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20091102.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
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interstate commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)
(internal citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has long understood the Commerce Clause to be an
exceptionally wide grant of authority. In that regard, three important principles
have emerged from the Court’s cases that are relevant here. First, an activity
will be deemed to have a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce if the
activity, when aggregated with the similar activity of many others similarly
situated, will substantially affect interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 128 (1942). Second, local, non-economic activities will be held to
affect interstate commerce substantially if regulation of the activity is an
integral or essential part of a comprehensive regulation of interstate economic
activity, and if failure to regulate that activity would undercut the general
regulatory scheme. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005). Third, in
determining whether a regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, the Court “need not
determine whether . . . [the regulated activities] taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational
basis’ exists for so concluding. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). Congress’s
judgment that an activity would undermine the statutory scheme “is entitled to a
strong presumption of validity.” Id. at 28.
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Although the Commerce Clause authority to regulate interstate commerce
is thus broad, it is not without limits. Courts will not “pile inference upon
inference” to find that a local, noncommercial activity that is not part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme nonetheless substantially affects interstate
commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. In Lopez, the Court struck down the
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act which prohibited carrying of a gun within
1,000 feet of a school. In finding the statute outside of the authority of the
Commerce Clause, the Court observed that the act at issue was a criminal
statute that had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise” and was “not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated.” Id. at 561. See also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (sustaining Commerce Clause challenge to statutory
provision creating federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated
violence).
Lopez and Morrison notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s more recent
cases have reaffirmed the broad reach of Congress’s commerce clause
authority. In Raich, for example, the Court upheld federal power to prohibit
the wholly intrastate cultivation and possession of small amounts of marijuana
for medical purposes, despite express state policy to the contrary. 545 U.S. at
31–32. Expressly reaffirming its holding in Wickard, the Raich Court
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concluded that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that marijuana
cultivation is an “economic activity” that, in the aggregate, has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Raich also makes clear that Congress may
“regulate activities that form part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”
Id. at 24. In other words, Congress can regulate wholly intrastate activity to
make effective a comprehensive regulation of an interstate market. Id. at 36
(Scalia, J., concurring). Even if an activity is “’local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.’” Id. at 17
(quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128) (emphasis added).
Congress’s broad commerce power is also rooted in the Necessary and
Proper Clause. That clause authorizes the federal government to enact
regulations that, while not within the specifically enumerated powers of the
federal government, are nonetheless “‘necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution’ the powers ‘vested by’ the ‘Constitution in the Government of the
United States.’” United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010)
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18). In other words, the Necessary and
Proper clause permits Congress to enact regulations that are necessary or
convenient to the regulation of commerce. In Comstock, the Supreme Court
recently explained that the Necessary and Proper clause provides federal
regulatory authority where “the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the
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attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power or under other
powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.”
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1957.
2.

The minimum coverage provision is constitutional because it
regulates activity that substantially affects interstate commerce
and because it is an essential part of comprehensive regulation
of interstate economic activity.
a.

The minimum coverage provision regulates activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.

In the ACA, Congress specifically found that the minimum coverage
requirement is “commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects
interstate commerce.” ACA § 1501(a)(1).17 Congress certainly had a rational
basis for reaching that conclusion. An individual’s decision to purchase—or
not purchase—health insurance is an economic activity that, when taken
together with the activities of all individuals similarly situated, substantially
affects the market for health insurance and health care. Appellants claim that
an individual who fails to purchase health insurance “is neither engaged in
economic activity nor in any other activity that would bring him or her within
the reach of even a legitimate regulator scheme.” Appellants’ Br. at 29. But
this assertion is contradicted by the reality of the health care and health
insurance markets, where the aggregated purchasing decisions of individuals

17

See also ACA § 1501(a)(2) (describing the effects of the minimum
coverage requirement on the national economy).
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who choose not to maintain health insurance—because they cannot afford it or
for some other reason—have a powerful and generally adverse impact on those
markets. In the aggregate, these economic decisions regarding how to pay for
health care services—including, in particular, decisions to forgo coverage and
to pay later or, if need be, to depend on free care—have a substantial effect on
the interstate health care market. As the Supreme Court recognized in Raich
and in Wickard, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate these
direct and aggregate effects. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 16–17; Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 127–28.
When individuals choose not to purchase health insurance, they are still
participants in the interstate health care marketplace. When the uninsured get
sick, they seek medical attention within the health care system. The medical
care provided to the uninsured costs a substantial amount of money.
Approximately one third of the cost of that care is covered by the uninsured
themselves. The remaining two thirds of the cost are passed on to other public
and private actors in the interstate health care and health insurance system,
including the state and federal governments, multi-state private insurance
companies, and large multi-state employers. Although researchers disagree as
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to the price tag for uncompensated care, it is generally agreed that the cost is
substantial—billions of dollars each year.18
California’s experience illustrates the financial impact of the uninsured
on the health care market. Because the uninsured are often unable to pay their
medical bills, providers shift those costs onto the insured. Experts have
estimated that this so-called “hidden tax” amounts to $455 per individual or
$1,186 per family each year.19 Hospitals foot this bill as well. In 2008,
uncompensated care in California constituted between 5 and 7 percent of public
hospitals’ operating expenses and 3 percent of private hospitals’ operating
expenses.20 To put this figure in perspective, public hospitals have a median net
income margin between 0.04% and 2.5%, whereas private hospitals have a
median net income margin between 2.4 percent and 5 percent.21

18

See, e.g., Dianne Miller Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller, The
Consequences of Uninsurance for Individuals, Families, Communities, and the
Nation, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 397, 402 (2004); Susan A. Channick, Can State
Health Reform Initiatives Achieve Universal Coverage? California’s Recent
Failed Experiment, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 485, 499 (2009).
19

Peter Harbage and Len M. Nichols, Ph.D., A Premium Price: The
Hidden Costs All Californians Pay in Our Fragmented Health Care System
(New America Foundation, Dec. 2006).
20

California HealthCare Foundation, California’s Health Care Safety
Net: Facts and Figures at 19 (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.chcf.org/publications/2010/10/californias-health-care-safety-netfacts-and-figures (last accessed Jan. 13, 2011).
21

Id. at 22.
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The cost of the uncompensated care provided to the uninsured is
magnified by the fact that the uninsured frequently delay seeking care. By the
time they are treated, their medical problems are often more costly to treat than
they would have been had they sought care earlier.22 Furthermore, because
emergency rooms are required by federal law to screen everybody who walks
through their doors and to provide stabilizing treatment to those with an
emergency medical condition, much of the care for the uninsured is delivered in
this costly and inefficient setting. Indeed, treatment in an emergency room
costs approximately three times as much as a visit to a primary care physician,
at a cost of approximately $4.4 billion across the United States.23
In addition to the direct impact on the health care and health insurance
systems, individuals who choose to forgo insurance affect the national economy
in other ways, including lost productivity due to poor health and personal
22

Hearings to Examine Health Care Access and Affordability and Its
Impact on the Economy: Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human
Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations,
108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Jack Hadley, Urban Institute), available at
http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/108s/89058.txt (last visited Jan. 19,
2011).
23
California Association of Health Plans, 10 Factors Driving Costs
for California’s Hospitals at 3 (Nov. 2010), available at
http://www.calhealthplans.org/documents/IssueBriefHospitalCostDriversNove
mber2010.pdf (last accessed Jan. 13, 2011); see also USC Center for Health
Financing, Policy, and Management, Marginal Costs of Emergency Department
Outpatient Visits: An update using California data (Nov. 2005) available at
ww.usc.edu/schools/sppd/research/healthresearch/images/pdf_reportspapers/mu
ltivariate_cost_paper_v5.pdf (last accessed Jan. 13, 2011).
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bankruptcies due to health care costs, and some of the limited health care
resources are shifted to emergency departments, rather than to preventative
care.24 In the aggregate, economic decisions regarding how to pay for health
care services, particularly decisions to forgo coverage, have a substantial effect
on the interstate health care market, because the costs of providing care to the
uninsured are passed on to everyone else through higher premiums, on average,
over $1,000 a year, and higher health care costs. ACA § 1501(a)(2)(F).
b.

The minimum coverage provision is an essential part of
comprehensive regulation of interstate economic activity.

Appellants’ Commerce Clause challenge also fails because the minimum
coverage provision is an essential part of comprehensive regulation of the
health care and health insurance industries. Health insurance and health care
are both economic activities in interstate commerce that are indisputably within
Congress’s Commerce Clause power to regulate. Seventeen percent of the
United States economy is devoted to health care. ACA § 1501(a)(2)(B). More
than 11 million people work in the US health care industry.25 The federal

24

Kaiser Family Foundation, Hospital Emergency Room Visits per
1,000 Population, 1999, available at
http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/comparetrend.jsp?yr=6&sub=94&cat
=8&ind=388&typ=1&sort=a&srgn=1 (last visited Jan. 12, 2011). From 1999 to
2008, emergency room visits rose from 365 to 404 per 1,000 population as
uninsured rates increased.
25
Kaiser Family Foundation, Total Health Care Employment, 2009,
available at
Footnote continued…
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government has for decades been deeply involved in healthcare regulation,
including, among other programs Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP. As the
Supreme Court recently recognized, such a longstanding history helps to
illustrate “the reasonableness of the relation between the new statute and preexisting federal interests.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958.
The minimum coverage provision is an essential component of creating
an affordable, accessible, and robust insurance market that all Americans can
rely on—the central goal of the ACA. As explained above, Congress’s purpose
in including the minimum coverage provision was to combat the problem of
adverse selection. It does that by incorporating healthy people into the risk
pool, thus driving down average costs. Moreover, without a minimum coverage
provision, it would be impossible to prohibit insurers from excluding from
coverage individuals with pre-existing conditions. In short, the minimum
coverage provision is an integral part of the ACA’s “comprehensive framework
for regulating” healthcare, the absence of which would severely undercut
Congress’s regulatory scheme. It is therefore constitutional under Raich.
(“Congress can . . . regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself
“commercial,” . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity

(…continued)

http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=445&cat=8 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2011).
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would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 3.).
For the same reasons, the minimum coverage provision is a means
“reasonably adapted” to achieving “a legitimate end under the commerce
power.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957. There can be no dispute that creating an
affordable and accessible health insurance market is a legitimate Congressional
goal, and one well within the scope of its commerce clause authority. The
minimum coverage provision is a reasonably adapted means to that end. The
provision is therefore a “necessary and proper” regulation that Congress is
empowered to enact. Id.
CONCLUSION
Congress plainly has the power to enact the ACA. This Court should
therefore uphold the district court’s order dismissing appellants’ complaint.
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